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INTRODUCTION
The criminal justice system has responded inadequately to
the moral and political significance of civil disobedience in our
society. As civil disobedients continue to be prosecuted for
crimes which they commit in response to a conflict between
binding legal and moral obligation, the enforcement of the law
confronts a fundamental tenet of our society: freedom of con-
science. In this article, I propose one solution to the problem
of how to respond to the difference between civil disobedients
and ordinary criminals. By amending the Model Penal Code
and the Federal Rules of Evidence we would allow defendants
in criminal trials to admit, in some limited circumstances, testi-
mony relevant to the motive for their actions. This amendment
MOTIVE TESTIMONY
gives the jury or judge the ability to assess the culpability of the
defendant in light of those characteristics which distinguish her
from an ordinary criminal.
In Part I of this article, I will discuss some of the highlights
of the robust history of civil disobedience in this country.
Against the backdrop of that history, I will then explore the
nature of legal duty and moral obligation in order to arrive at a
suitable definition of civil disobedience. Part I will conclude
with a discussion of some morally significant distinctions
between the civil disobedient and other people who break laws.
In Part II of this article, I will examine various suggestions
for how the judiciary ought to respond to civil disobedients.
After arguing that none of these proposals are adequate, I will
recommend the development of a Civil Disobedience Justifica-
tion for one class of defendants. Two examples of civil disobe-
dience will demonstrate why motive testimony has not been
allowed in the past., and five of the most common problems
associated with the use of motive testimony will be explored.
In light of these problems, I present a proposed amendment to
the Model Penal Code and Federal Rules of Evidence allowing
the use of motive testimony and providing the qualifying provi-
sions necessary to accommodate the risks involved. I conclude
by responding to those problems and suggest that the admis-
sion of motive testimony as part of a Civil Disobedience Justifi-
cation can be tailored to satisfy these objections.
I. DISOBEDIENCE-HISTORY, DUTY AND A DEFINITION
A. Disobedience in America
From the Boston Tea Party to the Catonsville Nine, from
the Underground Railroad to Operation Rescue, when legal
remedies have failed or have been perceived as bound to fail,
Americans have voiced their opposition to law through some
form of civil disobedience. Despite its long presence within the
history of the United States,' civil disobedience, as a concept,
has eluded definition by the criminal law.
1. See, e.g., the abolitionist clergyman, Theodore Parker, who said in
opposition to the Mexican War:
* . . We are a rebellious nation; our whole history is treason; our
blood was attainted before we were born; our creeds are infidelity to
the mother church; our constitution treason to our fatherland. What
of that? Though all the governors in the world bid us commit
treason against man, and set the example, let us never submit. Let
God only be a master to control our conscience.
Quoted in M. BAssIOUNI, LAw OF DIssENT AND RIOTS 155 (1971).
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Because this country was born of open defiance of the law
and because principled violation of legal obligations has con-
tinued until this day, it should come as some surprise that our
criminal justice system lacks a definition of civil disobedience
which distinguishes those who engage in such acts from other
people who violate the law. In the second part of this section, I
will show that there are strong analytical reasons for making
such a distinction and for seeing our jurisprudence to date as
inadequate to the task. Before analyzing the requirements of
obedience and disobedience, I will sketch out, in brief, the his-
tory of civil disobedience in this country. That history will
describe some of the important contributions civil disobedi-
ence has made to the dialectic of American political life by con-
centrating on seven related but distinct periods of its use in
America.
1. Pre-Revolution-Religious Toleration
The history of American civil disobedience begins for all
practical purposes with resistance to religious persecution
imported from England and the Continent. Later, conscience-
based objection to specific laws would become the norm.2 To
establish the rights of individual conscience, minority religious
groups first had to gain the foothold of toleration. In the
multi-ethnic and multi-religious colonies, toleration did not
come easily.
Within each of the new colonies one religious group was
generally prominent. As a result, the Tocquevillian conflict
between majority and minority groups was born.' This conflict
informs all the civil disobedience which followed in America.
The intimacy of the church-state relationship in the colonial
period made predominantly religious confrontations into civil
questions.
The colonies can be divided into four types: first, the "free
colonies" which never had state churches, Rhode Island, Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey; second, what Hofstadter
calls the "vacant establishments" where the Anglican church
was established by law but where Anglicans did not represent a
significant enough majority of the population to exercise con-
trol, New York, Maryland, the Carolinas, and Georgia; third,
Virginia, where the Anglican church held substantial control
and acted on it; and finally, Puritan Massachusetts and Con-
2. D. WERER, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN AMERICA 20 (1978).
3. See, e.g., A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 246-76 (J.P. Mayer
ed. 1969) (Chapters Seven and Eight).
MOTIVE TESTIMONY
necticut.4 Note first that the English, Dutch, French, and Span-
ish who settled this land did not set out to establish a regime of
toleration. The colonies were an export operation. "[Plower,
profits, and internal unity" were priority goals; evangelization
was not.5 Because much of the public protest was against the
governments of the fourth group, Massachusetts and Connecti-
cut, I will focus on disobedience in those territories.
Quakers faced stiff opposition in Massachusetts. Quakers
objected to restrictions on their right to worship, to hold office,
and to preach.6 They also refused to pay taxes used for mili-
tary purposes.7 They, and later Baptists as well, were exe-
cuted,' banished, or subject to corporal punishment.9 The
severe punishments they suffered attracted much public atten-
tion and eventually resulted in less repressive laws.
Civil disobedience in America began as the colonists strug-
gled to adapt to religious pluralism and grew to accept the con-
cept of freedom of conscience.'" From the challenge of the
Quakers the colonists learned that it was indeed possible to
vindicate the claims of individual conscience without under-
mining the stability of civil government. The American insis-
tence on the separation of church and state began."
2. Revolution-E Pluribus Unum
The Revolution of 1776 may seem an improper place to
discuss the phenomenon of civil disobedience in America. I
include it in this brief history because one of the reasons for
not accepting the validity of civil disobedience as an expression
of social protest has been the fear of revolution or general law-
lessness.' 2 The Revolution and the protests which preceded it
4. R. HOFSTADTER, AMERICA AT 1750 198-99 (1971).
5. Id. at 189.
6. Id. at 182.
7. See generally S. LYND, NONVIOLENCE IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY xvii-xxiii and 5-6 (1966). See also D. WEBER, supra note 2, at 19.
8. R. HOFSTATDER, supra note 4, at 193.
9. See generally D. WEBER, supra note 2, at 19.
10. See id. at 20.
11. R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 4, at 182.
12. A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 47-61
(1968). This claim has been contested. See, e.g., C. WHITTAKER & W. COFFIN,
LAW, ORDER AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 31 (1967). The difference between
civil disobedience and revolution is complicated. The point of my efforts
here is not to exhaust the sophisticated distinctions that need to be made but
only to introduce what I see as the fundamental difference between the two
species of civil protest. For a comprehensive treatment of the subject, see H.
ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1963).
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provide me with a good opportunity to distinguish civil disobe-
dience from revolution.
The Revolution in America in 1776 found philosophical
foundation in the social contract theorists and seventeenth-
century English revolutionaries Milton, Sidney, and Locke.'"
The Colonists looked back on the English Revolution of 1688-
89 and the unwritten constitution that followed to find support
for their fundamental presupposition: both the ruler and the
ruled were subject to the law.' 4 They sought a return, a revolu-
tion, to traditional practices of British rule. Only when they
knew that the return they sought was impossible did they seek
in earnest a complete break. The Stamp Act and other taxation
efforts were the catalyst for that break.
The Stamp Act went into effect on March 22, 1765.15
Colonial petitions against the Act had been ignored by Parlia-
ment. Public frustration grew into public action. The first
demonstrations against the Stamp Act occurred in August of
1765. On the fourteenth, Bostonians paraded an effigy of the
future stamp distributor around the city before they burned it;
they leveled the building that was to be his office; and they
attacked his home. The stampman quit the next day. They
demonstrated again on the twenty-sixth, but that action was
more a riot than a protest. In later weeks and months, the
action on the fourteenth would be praised for its restraint and
the events of the twenty-sixth would be criticized for their reck-
lessness and damage to personal property. These demonstra-
tors represented oddly wedded social groups in the stratified
colonies. The uprisings were started by "a social club of
respectable merchants and tradesmen " " and were finished by
mobs.
These demonstrations and the similar protests in other
colonies which followed became the models for resistance
throughout the period that preceded the revolution. Failed
constitutional efforts were followed by demonstrations, organi-
zation, and boycotts. Eventually the resistance to British efforts
13. P. MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION 27 (1973).
14. Id. at 29.
15. The act placed stamp duties upon "colonial legal documents,
papers, almanacs, newspapers, and newspaper advertisements to help finance
British military expenses in America. The duties or taxes had to be paid in
gold or silver, and violations of the act could be tried in admiralty as well as
common law courts." M.JENSEN, THE FOUNDING OF A NATION: A HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1763-1776 65 (1968) (cited in P. MAIER, supra
note 13, at 51).
16. Id. at 58.
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to restrict American trade, to extract taxes at unbearable levels,
and to continue managerial control from afar encouraged the
colonists to organize. The Intercolonial Sons of Liberty were
formed. The Sons of Liberty began with men from the upper
and middle ranks of colonial society but soon broadened to
include all social and economic subgroups.
17
The Sons of Liberty took on the Stamp Act and its repeal
as their special charge. When it looked as if the British might
seek to enforce the Stamp Act with force, the Sons of Liberty
promised to oppose force with force.' 8 Since force was not
widespread at this time, their main action was to encourage
people to refuse to pay their Stamp Act dues. Throughout this
early period, the Sons of Liberty insisted that they intended to
uphold, not overturn, the established government.' 9 When the
Stamp Act was repealed and the Acts of Trade with America
were reconsidered the Sons of Liberty movement dissolved.2 °
The opposition to the Stamp Act and the Sons of Liberty
movement represent the first widespread use in North America
of political protest as a means for people without political influ-
ence to induce social change. Relations with the British contin-
ued to deteriorate. The Townsend Revenue Act, the New York
Restraining Act, the Quartering Act, the Boston Massacre, the
defeat of the Regulators, and the impotency of petitioning from
the Baltimore Committee of Correspondence all exacerbated
the colonial feelings of oppression. At some point, probably
just after the new English Parliament opened in December of
1774, the protestors of the late sixties and early seventies
became interested not only in removing odious tax burdens,
but also in liberating the colonies from the despotism of
George the Third.
This change marks the difference between civil disobedi-
ence and revolution. Even though the disobedience of the col-
onists had not always been "civil," it had not, previous to 1774
or there about, sought to throw off the existing government.
Revolution is concerned with liberation and freedom, not
reform.' In the minds of the American Revolutionaries, all the
organs of their government, the King, Parliament, and their
ministers, had systematically violated the constitution and laws.
The social contract was broken and their rulers had forfeited
17. P. MAIER, supra note 13, at 86-88.
18. Id. at 94.
19. Id. at 96. See also H. ARENDT, supra note 12, at 13-52.
20. P. MAIER, supra note 13, at 111.
21. H. ARENDT, supra note 12, at 25.
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their authority. Colonists, oppressed by what they had consid-
ered the "freest government in the world,"22 became revolu-
tionaries when they physically demonstrated their freedom by
ousting the British occupying troops. The transformation of
colonial actions helps to illuminate the important distinction
between civil disobedience and revolution. Revolutionaries
contest the legitimacy of a government; civil disobedience may
be part of a revolutionary campaign, but civil disobedients gen-
erally recognize that a legitimate government is acting, albeit
illegitimately.
From this point forward my comments will address only
civil disobedience. Therefore, when I use this term I, by defini-
tion, exclude other forms of social protest which claim as their
aim the overthrow of the government.23 The sections which
follow will be more brief and will be used to describe some of
the instances of civil disobedience in American history, the the-
ories which supported them, and the benefits gained from
them.
3. Slavery-All Men Are Created Equal
Slavery and its residual effects have caused the greatest
political rift in American history. No political question has
been so divisive and no issue has brought this country as close
to dissolution. Though more than one hundred years have
passed since slavery was abolished, America is not yet finished
with its racial problems. "Slavery was but one aspect of a race
and color problem that is still far from solution here, or
anywhere." 24
Any discussion of civil disobedience in America would be
incomplete without including both the resistance to the phe-
nomenon of slavery and the philosophy of Henry Thoreau.
Fortunately, the two complement one another. Thoreau pro-
vided theoretical expression for the spirit that resisted the slave
trade. The Underground Railroad was one of that spirit's overt
manifestations. I will address each in turn.
Henry Thoreau, in On the Duty of Civil Disobedience, claimed
that, "All men recognize the right of revolution; that is, the
right to refuse allegiance to and to resist the government, when
its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable. But
22. P. MAIER, supra note 13, at 269.
23. I will present a formal definition of civil disobedience later. See text
accompanying notes 89-94 infra.
24. 2 S.E. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
281 (1965).
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almost all say that such is not the case now."25 Thoreau drew
attention to the tension between the majority who want to pre-
serve the status quo and citizens who disobey the law to inspire
change. Most people agree that citizens appropriately disobey
laws they perceive as unjust. Nonetheless most people also dis-
approve of the civil disobedience they observe in their time.26
By definition, civil disobedience, then, cuts against the grain of
societal approval.
Thoreau believed that the right, indeed the duty, to diso-
bey unjust laws exists within the relationship between citizens
and governments. He emphasized the primacy of the individ-
ual conscience and personal freedom as a prerequisite for
human flourishing. As a result, he concluded that the individ-
ual's responsibility was first to his own beliefs and then to the
requirements of the state. Thoreau is significant because he
synthesized two previously separate strands of thought: the
Christian emphasis on following the mandates of conscience
and the Lockean justification of revolution which undergirded
the resistance to and eventual break from England.
Individual citizens, as well as Africans forcibly transported,
held, and oppressed here, questioned the legitimacy of the gov-
ernment that made the slave trade possible. Thoreau distin-
guished himself from "no government men." He appealed for
a better government, one that would command respect.27 He
resisted recognizing "that political organization as my govern-
ment which is the slave's government also."-28 From William
Lloyd Garrison, who demanded immediate emancipation or
secession of the free states, to Wendell Phillips, who used his
oratorical abilities to impress listeners with the shame of slav-
ery, the abolitionists represented a wide swath of the socioeco-
nomic groups of the north. They too joined Thoreau's cry for
a better government.
In time, slaves and sympathetic free people began both
open and covert efforts to end the slave system. The most
famous of these efforts was called the Underground Railroad.
It operated simply enough. Slaves hid in the woods or other
25. H. THOREAU, WALDEN AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 225 (1960)
(Thoreau's essay on civil disobedience was first published in 1849).
26. "There are thousands who are in opinion opposed to slavery and to
the war, who yet in effect do nothing to put an end to them; who, esteeming
themselves children of Washington and Franklin, sit down with their hands in
their pockets, and say that they know not what to do, and do nothing .. " H.
THOREAU, id. at 226 (emphasis in original).
27. Id. at 223 (emphasis in original).
28. Id. at 224 (emphasis in original).
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cover near their master's house, and then, when possible, fol-
lowed the North Star to the free states. There, friendly
northerners hid them during the day and transported them
undercover or assisted them in getting to another safe house.
Quakers sheltered and assisted many runaway slaves, as did
former slaves and free blacks.29 Slave catchers roamed the
north in search of fugitive slaves, making the trip perilous.
This type of covert resistance was not the revolution of one
envisioned by Thoreau nor was it a strict form of civil disobedi-
ence, but it too captured hold of those two previously separate
strands joined by Thoreau-primacy of individual conscience
and Lockean rights theory. The Quakers, free blacks, and
other northerners who conducted the Underground Railroad
assumed the one obligation Thoreau claimed able to accept: to
do at any time what they thought right.3 °
Through the public actions of the abolitionist speakers and
politicians, public opinion turned against the atrocity of slav-
ery. Through the quiet action of the Underground Railroad,
the legal order which supported slavery gradually degenerated.
After a long and bloody conflict, Lincoln's goal of preserving
the Union was achieved and slavery ended.
The last two examples I described began in resistance and
ended in revolution or civil war. Civil disobedience has always
walked a precarious line on the other side of which lies vio-
lence. For this reason, some critics of civil disobedience as a
form of social protest have decried its utility.3 ' Thoreau
responded by asking, "Why does [the government] not cherish
its wise minority? ... Why does it not encourage its citizens to
be on the alert to point out its faults, and do better than it
would have them?""2 His question is the genesis for this arti-
cle. In the remaining sections I will describe some of the signif-
icant civil disobedient movements of this century. For the most
part, they were conducted without violence. At least, violence
was not the focus of the actions and there has never again been
a serious threat of civil war in this country.
29. Harriet Tubman escaped and returned to the South to help
hundreds of slaves find their way to the free north. See 2 S.E. MORISON, supra
note 24, at 277. She was also not the only black woman involved in
emancipating blacks and aiding the North in the war. See H. ZINN, A PEOPLE'S
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 188 (1980).
30. H. THOREAU, supra note 25, at 223.
31. See, e.g., A. FORTAS, supra note 12.
32. H. THOREAU, supra note 25, at 229.
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4. Women-All People Are Created Equal
Civil Disobedience in the twentieth century has been dif-
ferent from what it was in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
tury. The legitimacy of the form of government and the
existing ruling elite has not been seriously questioned by the
prototypical civil disobedient. I do not mean to imply that the
challenges have been less significant-they have not-but they
have been more directly focused on righting injustices in a gen-
erally just system.
The struggle for women's rights represents that type of
challenge I have been describing. Women have used the full
means of political action available to them (running for public
office, acquiring increased economic independence, engaging
in protest actions, and educating society at large) to try to
improve their situation in society. Their efforts to gain inde-
pendence and political identity began as part of the abolitionist
movement. 3 Advocates of freedom for blacks, such as William
Garrison, included women in their movement early on. The
women's suffrage movement began in the 1840s and ended in
1920 with the passage of the nineteenth amendment.3 4
For the purposes of this article, the suffrage movement for
women is significant because it both represents the union of
the two traditions Thoreau joined and portended the style of
disobedience that has become typical in the twentieth century.
Lucretia Mott drew upon her Quaker belief in the equality of
the sexes and its tradition of opposition to unjust laws to
respond to the oppression she and other women experienced
when speaking out on social issues.
In July of 1848 on a trip in upstate New York, Mott and
Elizabeth Cady Staton had the idea of a convention to discuss
the subject of women's rights. The resulting "Declaration of
Sentiments and Resolutions of the First Women's Rights Con-
33. S. LYND, supra note 7, at 160. Even Lincoln, known as a moderate
conservative, included women in his plans for reelection as an Illinois
legislator in 1836. He said, "I go for all sharing the privileges of government
who assist in bearing its burdens. Consequently I go for admitting all whites
to the right of suffrage who pay taxes or bear arms (by no means excluding
females)." See R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 4, at 128. See also 2 S.E. MORISON,
.supra note 24, at 273.
34. 3 S.E. MoRIsoN, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
237 (1965). Women have been, both before and after the nineteenth
amendment, active in civil disobedience and political resistance in this
country. I do not mean to imply either that their special struggles are over or
that they have not been involved. Here I only address suffrage.
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vention"35 adopted Jeffersonian natural rights language. The
Declaration began by harkening back to common origins:
"When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary
for one portion of the family of man to assume among the peo-
ple of the earth a position different from that which they have
hitherto occupied. *"36 The resolutions which followed
adopted plain natural law foundations which would be heard
later in the race conflicts of the sixties.3 7
After 1848, the women's movement became more demon-
strative. In 1872 Susan B. Anthony organized women to regis-
ter and vote illegally under the theory that the language of the
fourteenth amendment already entitled them to the right to
vote.38 She was convicted but refused to pay the fine assessed
her. About the same time, Abbey and Julia Smith resisted pay-
ing tax assessments increased against women because they
were barred from participating in the decisions against them.
39
In the early years of this century, women were active also
in protests against the First World War. They used traditional
methods of persuasion including petitions, lobbying, and writ-
ing. They also pressed the new Wilson administration to pass
the National Suffrage Amendment. 40 When those efforts failed
and Wilson had already been elected for a second term, more
militant feminists, led by Alice Paul, took to the streets to begin
an extended picket of the White House and the seemingly
ambivalent Wilson. When the women were arrested and jailed
for "obstructing the traffic,"'4 ' they undertook hunger strikes to
draw attention and sympathy to their plight. The news of their
detention and subsequent force feedings attracted national
35. See D. WEBER, supra note 2, at 180-84.
36. Id. at 180.
37. Resolved, That such laws as conflict, in any way, with the true and
substantial happiness of woman, are contrary to the great precept of nature
and of no validity, for this is "superior in obligation to any other."
Resolved, That all laws which prevent woman from occupying such a
station in society as her conscience shall dictate, or which place her in a
position inferior to that of man, are contrary to the great precept of nature,
and therefore of no force or authority. Id. at 182-83.
38. Her argument appealed to the privileges or immunities clause of
the amendment, which provides that "[N]o State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States." See D. WEBER, supra note 2, at 184-85. Her directed verdict in that
case may have been the last time such a verdict was rendered in a criminal
case. See United States v. Anthony, 24 F.Cas. 829 (N.D. New York 1873).
39. See D. WEBER, supra note 2, at 188-95.
40. D. WEBER, supra note 2., at 195-202.
41. Id. at 198.
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attention that ultimately helped the passage of the nineteenth
amendment.4 2
These pioneers were some of the first women leaders in
this country. Some of their protests broke the law and some
did not, but they merit attention in this history nonetheless.
Their style of protest is a style that has been replicated
throughout the years that have followed: 1) they tied their
claims of oppression to violations of the fundamental concepts
of freedom and liberty as well as to claims of moral injustice, 2)
they first pursued legal means of voicing their concerns and
empowering their voices, and 3) when those methods proved
unsuccessful, they violated unjust laws or laws in order to
demonstrate the injustice they suffered to the community at
large.
5. Labor-Is the Government a Friend or Foe?
The kinds of protests that typified the labor movement in
this country are not ordinarily the type of actions that can be
classified as civil disobedience.4 - For one thing, the "labor
movement," the goals of which included better working condi-
tions, better wages, child labor regulation, safety and health
protection, and uniform working hours, was not a single cam-
paign. Over many years a series of episodic disputes resulted
in increased governmental action. America's industrialization
after the Civil War meant that machines could more produc-
tively and less expensively duplicate the human workforce.44
For the next seventy years, until the passage of a long string of
government regulations,45 American workers struggled to
assert standards of human decency within the current of capi-
talism given free reign.
42. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of sex."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1.
43. In this regard I acknowledge that the violence associated with the
labor movement was initiated by both sides. To the extent that workers acted
violently, I believe that their actions were less "civilly" disobedient and more
revolutionary. The presence of some violence, however, does not in my mind
transform a generally non-violent movement into a revolution. This case is
special also, because many of the disputes were with owners or managers and
not with the state directly. Even so the state that allowed the gross abuse of
the rights of workers was also, indirectly, imputed.
44. H. ZINN, supra note 29, at 247-48.
45. The Clayton Act, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the La Follette
Seaman's Act, the Adamson Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the
creation of the Federal Trade Commission. See R. HOFSTADTER, THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 334-35 (1973).
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Ostensibly, most of those disputes were with private
employers and not with the government. What was really at
issue, however, was whether the government could or should
regulate employee-employer relationships. When employee
demonstrations were broken up or when sit-ins were forcibly
cleared, the government acted to support property and con-
tract rights against the human dignity claims of labor.4 6 In so
far as labor was also protesting the governmental protection of
a system they saw as oppressive, the.actions of the labor move-
ment can in fact be seen as a form of civil disobedience.
Finally, the labor movement initiated the style and organi-
zational structure of the civil rights demonstrations to follow
later. Labor protests, such as the sit-in strikes at twenty Gen-
eral Motors plants in 1936 and 1937,47 involved hundreds of
thousands of people and lasted for months. The strikes were
highly organized, with the union acting as the source of com-
mand. By using the overwhelming force of numbers, combined
with a unified voice speaking through one mouthpiece, the
workers were successful in forcing management to respond to
their complaints. Labor also employed what Big Bill Haywood
called "direct action" in the form of the general strike. Work-
ers committed to support the actions of other workers in other
unions; broad cross-sections of the workforce protested condi-
tions in one industry. The practice of "filling the jails," later
utilized by the Civil Rights movement began with this cross-
spectrum of workers accepting incarceration to demonstrate
their resolve.
6. Civil Rights-Equal Not Separate
I will resist the temptation to spend too much time
describing the events of the Civil Rights movement of the
1960s. Those days are too recent and the details still too clear
for my brief statement of what happened to be of much use.
46. See the Industrial Workers of the World Preamble:
There can be no peace so long as hunger and want are found
among millions of the working people, and the few who make up the
employing class have all the good things of life.
Between these two classes a struggle must go on until the
workers of the world organize as a class, take possession of the
earth, and the machinery of production, and abolish the wage
system.
Quoted in S. LYND, supra note 7, at 240-41.
47. For one account of the organization and methods of those strikes,
see S. LYND, supra note 7, at 241-70.
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Suffice it to say that the Civil Rights movement built on the
protest movements that preceded it.
The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
48
adopted the direct action tactics of the Wobblies before them.
They filled the jails with people willing to demonstrate publicly
and to suffer personally so that they might expose the injustice
of the system.49 Sit-ins, hunger strikes, parades, pickets, dem-
onstrations, registration of black voters, public appeals, passive
resistance to abusive police forces, and boycotts were all
employed in this dramatic effort to make the freedom of the
fourteenth amendment real. The names of the events have
taken on meaning and significance of their own: Brown v. Board
of Education,5 ° the Montgomery bus boycott,5 ' the lunch
counter sit-ins,5 1 the Freedom Rides, 53 the Mississippi Sum-
mer,54 the Birmingham Manifesto, 55 the Letter from a Birming-
ham Jail,56 the March on WashingtonY.5  Not all of the events
that made up the Civil Rights movement would qualify as civil
disobedience; neither the voter registration efforts nor the vio-
lence blacks returned to police would satisfy the terms of civil
disobedience action. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that
the movement as a whole is a great example of the power of
civil disobedience to change unjust social orders.
The Civil Rights movement is also important because it
brought forth the most prominent American civil disobedience
theorist since Thoreau. Drawing upon the Natural Law tradi-
tion of St. Thomas Aquinas and the political philosophy of
Mahatma Gandhi (who was in turn influenced by Thoreau), the
Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. based his critique of the
American political system upon the nature of unjust laws and
the proper response to their mandates. All around him he saw
that Black Americans were not treated equally with White
Americans. Unjust laws supported that inequality and so ren-
dered themselves illegitimate. On the subject ofjust disobedi-
48. See their Statement of Purpose, quoted in S. LYND, supra note 7, at
398-99.
49. See Thomas Giather'sJailed-In, in S. LYND, supra note 7, at 399-415.
50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51. Symbolically begun in 1955 by a forty-three year old seamstress,
Rosa Parks, who refused to move to the back of the bus. See H. ZINN, supra
note 29, at 442.
52. Id. at 444.
53. S. LYND, supra note 7, at 415-28.
54. H. ZINN, supra note 29, at 447-48.
55. See S. LYND, supra note 7, at 458-60.
56. See id. at 461-81.
57. H. ZINN, supra note 29, at 448-50.
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ence to those laws, he said, "One who breaks an unjust law
must do it openly, lovingly .... and with a willingness to accept
the penalty."58 A citizen confronted with a law that conflicts
with basic standards of human dignity and violates the mandate
of conscience, can, indeed should, refuse to obey that law. In
organizing a movement of civil disobedience, King called for
four basic steps: 1) collecting the facts, 2) negotiation, 3) self-
purification, and 4) direct action.59 All were important and
necessary steps to validate the violation of the law. Like the
other civil disobedients before him, King sought to draw atten-
tion to the injustice of the political system through direct, but
non-violent, defiance of or refusal to comply with unjust laws.
7. Anti-Vietnam-The Government Can't Hear Me
Protests to conditions in Vietnam under the United States-
established regime of Ngo Dnh Diem began even before the
United States entered the war. In June of 1963, a Buddhist
monk sat down in the square in Saigon and set himself on fire
to dramatize his opposition to the Diem regime.60 Other
monks committed suicide as well. After the United States
overtly joined the war against communist North Vietnam,
Americans Norman Morrison and Alice Herz similarly lit them-
selves on fire to protest the war.6' The dramatic nature of
these protests underscored the depth of their opposition to the
United States actions in Southeast Asia.
The civil disobedience associated with the anti-war move-
ment was similar in kind to the disobedience of earlier days. It
is noted for the involvement of university students62 and mem-
bers of the clergy,6" but thousands of other Americans joined
in the protests. Black soldiers especially, who represented a
disproportionate number of men fighting in Vietnam and who
also experienced army racism, grew disenchanted with a war
that was not their own and that they increasingly saw as
58. King, Letter from a Birmingham Jail, in S. LYND, supra note 7, at 469
(emphasis in original).
59. Id. at 463.
60. H. ZINN, supra note 29, at 464. Note that as this article was being
completed a similar tragedy occurred in Amherst, Massachusetts as Gregory
Levy set himself on fire to protest the war in the Persian Gulf.
61. On the second of November, 1965, Morrison, a father of three, set
himself on fire outside Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's window. Later
that year, Alice Herz, age eighty-two, committed suicide in Detroit to protest
the horrors going on in Indochina. Id. at 476-77.
62. Id. at 481-82.
63. Id. at 479-81.
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unjust.' In marches, demonstrations, responses to polls, and
letters to newspapers Americans voiced their dissatisfaction
with a war that many people believed the United States should
not be fighting.
The protests against the war in Vietnam did not introduce
any radically different tactics into the performance of civil diso-
bedience. They are important because they represent a recent
and widespread series of protests, not against a specific unjust
law, but against a particular government action. That action
directly involved only the executive branch, but insofar as the
decisions of the executive branch were supported economically
and politically by Congress and legally by the Supreme Court,
it involved the whole government. Many citizens perceived
themselves as unable to affect the decisions of a "representa-
tive" government far removed from their voices. The story of
the Vietnam war, for those who used public protest as a means
of expressing their horror at the actions of their government, is
a story of frustration, but also of action.
I include the anti-war movement at the close of my brief
history of civil disobedience in America also because it allows
me to introduce two acts of civil disobedience which will be dis-
cussed later in this article.6 5 The Berrigan brothers, as they are
both affectionately and critically know, were two of many mem-
bers of the Catholic clergy who protested the war in Vietnam.
They attracted national attention first in the fall of 1967 when
Fr. Philip Berrigan, with three other men, poured blood
(including their own) over the draft records of the draft board
in Baltimore, Maryland. They waited to be arrested; they were
tried, convicted and sentenced to two to six years in prison. In
May of 1968, Philip Berrigan, who was out on bail, and his
brother Daniel, who was also a priest, entered the office of the
draft board in Catonsville Maryland with seven other people.
They had previously informed the press about what they
intended to do, and in the presence of onlookers, they removed
the draft records, doused them with napalm, and lit them on
fire. Their act, their conviction, and later efforts by the govern-
ment to imprison them made them famous. They became
known as the Catonsville Nine.
66
While in prison, Fr. Dan Berrigan wrote the following:
64. Id. at 485-88.
65. See text accompanying notes 124-43 infra.
66. H. ZINN, supra note 29, at 479-80. See also THE BERRIGANS (W.V.
Casey & P. Nobile eds. 1971).
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Our apologies, good friends, for the fracture of good
order, the burning of paper instead of children, the
angering of the orderlies in the front parlor of the char-
nel house. We could not, so help us God, do other-
wise .... We say: killing is disorder, life and gentleness
and community and unselfishness is the only order we
recognize. For the sake of that order, we risk our liberty,
our good name. The time is past when good men can
remain silent, when obedience can segregate men from
public risk, when the poor can die without defense.
67
I conclude this history with the Berrigans because their act of
disobedience typifies the type of civil disobedience I would
consider justifiable. I worry a bit about the destruction of
property, but in these instances it was limited enough and nec-
essary enough to be acceptable. I end their story with this quo-
tation because it gives voice to the conflict that most true civil
disobedients experience and the interests that they balance in
deciding to go forward with their action. I will return to the
legal story of their prosecution because it exemplifies the inad-
equacies of our current jurisprudence.
8. Conclusions From History
I draw attention to the existence of civil disobedience in
this history because those events should inform our response
to civil disobedience today. Repeating the stories is important.
We must not forget the inequities of the past; they remind us of
the suffering endured to create the more just society we enjoy
today. Civil disobedience has not ended. Only the people
involved and the causes have changed. The Intercolonial Sons
of Liberty, the Underground Railroad, and the Wobblies have
been replaced today by groups known as Operation Rescue,
the Plowshares, Act Up, the Sanctuary Movement, Earth First!,
and Greenpeace. Like their predecessors, they and others pro-
test what they perceive to be social injustices. Because civil dis-
obedience has been an important catalyst for righting grave
injustices in our past, we should be predisposed to provide an
adequate legal response to its use, in the proper circumstances,
today.68
Before I can make my amendment to improve the Model
Penal Code, I should be clear about what civil disobedience is.
I will show that, like the historical uses and punishments of civil
disobedience described in the previous pages, the concept of
67. H. ZINN, supra note 29, at 479.
68. See generally R. DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 105 (1985).
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civil disobedience can be described in various ways. Before I
venture into a detailed discussion of the definitional require-
ments for civil disobedience, however, I will describe the moral
context in which the question of whether or not civil disobedi-
ence is justifiable arises. The definition of civil disobedience
and the justification of its use are closely aligned, but must be
distinguished. The section which follows will attempt to lay out
the moral context in which civil disobedience can be justified;
afterwards I will provide a definition of civil disobedience.
B. Duty and Obligation
I will restrict my comments on the conditions of political
obligation to what I, echoing Rawls, shall call a nearly just
democracy.69 By "nearly just democracy" I mean a society
which, on the whole, attempts to realize the requirements of
participatory government and which supports substantially just
institutions.7" A society of this kind rightly requires certain
responsibilities of its citizens and guarantees certain rights to
them. By contrast, the relationship between citizens and the
state, as well as the rights and responsibilities which result from
that relationship, in a nonrepresentative or totalitarian state
calls for a significantly different analysis of obligation to law
(thus altering the nature and significance of civil disobedience).
Even in a facially democratic state, such as South Africa, where
the institutions of society work substantially to the detriment of
a significant portion of the population, the relationship
between the individual and the state may become so distorted
that the restrictions on civil disobedience, which I will develop
later, might become inoperative. Notice, however, that I begin
with the rebuttable presupposition that, given the proper con-
ditions, obedience is rightly expected of a citizen in a nearly
just democracy. 7'
Citizens engage in civil disobedience when they perceive a
conflict between moral and legal obligation. Implicit in this
statement is the belief that both moral and legal obligations
69. Rawls states that '".. a person is required to do his part as defined
by the rules of an institution when two conditions are met: first, the
institution is just (or fair), that is, it satisfies the two principles ofjustice; and
second, one has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the arrangement or taken
advantage of the opportunities it offers to further one's interests." J. RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 111-12 (1971). These two conditions define when a
citizen is subject to obligations imposed on him by the state. Unless these
conditions exist, no duty to obey obtains.
70. Id. at 343.
71. See id. at 333-91.
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exist, and that it is possible that these two obligations require
contrary actions. Only if moral obligations can in some circum-
stances trump otherwise legitimate legal obligations is disobe-
dience justifiable. In the section which follows, I focus on the
sources of and interaction between moral and legal obligation.
Persons incur moral obligation by virtue of being human.7"
Moral obligations are predicated upon respect for oneself and
for others-for the physical integrity and personal dignity of
both self and others, and upon the acceptance of self and
others as moral beings. Moral obligations may be usefully bro-
ken down into two types." Moral obligations of the first order
include the prohibition against violating the physical integrity
and personal dignity of another person through the use of
force or fraud. First-order moral obligations also include those
positive actions with respect to other people necessary to rec-
ognize and affirm their status as moral beings. Moral obliga-
tions of the second order require personal and social support
of institutions that make realization of first order moral obliga-
tions possible. As a result, the state can generate second order
moral obligations that are binding upon its citizens.
Legal obligations are incurred by virtue of participating in
and receiving the benefits of a particular legal system. 74 Legal
theorists have articulated a variety of reasons which support a
duty to comply with legal obligations, but two main ideologies
prevail today: the Natural Law tradition and the Modern Lib-
eral tradition. Natural Law theorists view positive law as a
product of reason devising coercive and facilitative legal
regimes against a background of universally valid moral norms
derived from human nature.75 The prima facie obligation to
72. The nature and origin of moral obligation has, of course, been the
focus of much serious philosophical and theological reflection. A substantial
discussion of the intricacies of that argument would involve resources and
space beyond the purview of this article.
73. I am indebted to Dr. John H. Robinson, Associate Professor
University of Notre Dame Law School, for making this distinction clear to me.
74. See J. RAWLS, supra note 69, at 333-42 (1971). Note that this
statement entails an extraordinarily complex discussion that is, again, beyond
the scope of this article. To account fully for the nature and origin of this
duty, one would have to examine the source of a duty that is, for most
naturally-born citizens, not voluntarily chosen. To be meaningful, the duty
to obey the law also must overcome some favorable consequences of not
obeying. Further, the duty to obey must permit blame to be levied when the
duty to obey the law is breached. For a comprehensive and sophisticated
analysis of a prima facie obligation to obey the law, see K. GREENAWALT,
CONFLICTS OF MORALITY AND LAW 159-203 (1987).
75. For example, John Finnis describes the "principles of natural law"
as follows:
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obey the law results from the duty to support institutions which
promote human flourishing through cultivation of those
norms. By supporting the development of the common good,
the individual citizen also participates in the promotion of his
own individual good.76 Modem Liberal jurisprudence, follow-
ing Rawls, views the duty to obey the law as confluent with the
duty "to support and to further just institutions."" Combined
with the principle of fairness,7 s the duty to support just institu-
tions generates the duties and obligations of citizenship. Thus,
the Natural Law theorists and Modern Liberals both conclude
that citizens have legitimate legal obligations to obey the law;
our analysis of civil disobedience must focus upon the link or
interaction between moral obligations and legal obligations.
To the relationship between these two obligations I turn next.
Moral obligations differ from legal obligations, not only
substantively, but also hierarchically; that is to say that moral
obligations are sometimes superior to legal obligations. As a
result, conflicts in duty can arise which require a person to
choose to do what is morally obligatory in preference to what is
legally obligatory.79 The interaction between obligations of
different types requires an ordering of duties.
There is (i) a set of basic practical principles which indicate the basic
forms of human flourishing as goods to be pursued and realized and
which are in one way or another used by everyone who considers
what to do, however unsound his conclusions; and (ii) a set of basic
methodological requirements of practical reasonableness ... which
... provide the criteria for distinguishing between... ways of acting
that are morally right or morally wrong-thus enabling one to
formulate (iii) a set of general moral standards.
J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RiCHTs 23 (1980). See also T. AQUINAS,
SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-I, Q. 90-95, and J. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON 162
(1978).
76. For a more complete exposition of these ideas, see K. GREENAWALT,
supra note 74, at 161-62. See also C. COHEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 105-20
(1971).
77. J. RAWLS, supra note 69, at 334.
78. Rawls defines the principle of fairness as follows: "[A] person is
under an obligation to do his part as specified by the rules of an institution
whenever he has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the scheme or has taken
advantage of the opportunities it offers to advance his interests, provided that
this institution is just or fair... " Id. at. 342-43.
79. Indeed some Natural Law theorists believe the obligatory character
of a law ceases to exist when that law conflicts with moral norms. Joseph Raz,
in criticizing Natural Law theorists, says that "[n]atural lawyers can only
judge a law as morally valid, that is, just, or morally invalid, i.e. wrong. They
cannot say of a law that it is legally valid but morally wrong. If it is wrong and
unjust, it is also invalid in the only sense of validity they recognize." Raz,
Kelson's Theory of the Basic Norm, 19 AM. J. JURIS. 94, 100 (1974).
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When an act that would otherwise be morally permissible
is legally proscribed (marginally exceeding the speed limit on a
deserted highway, for example), the second-order moral obli-
gation to support institutions which further justice is likely to
require acquiescence to the legal demands. In the same way,
an act that is legally permissible, but morally proscribed (e.g.
revealing legally admissible evidence of the sexual history of a
plaintiff that is substantially irrelevant to the issue of guilt in a
sexual harassment suit)"° remains morally proscribed regard-
less of legal approval. These examples reveal that the permissi-
ble is superseded by the obligatory or absolute, whether legal
or moral. In order for individuals to make peace with conflict-
ing requirements, the permissible should ordinarily give way to
the compulsory.
The true test of the rigor of legal obligation arises when
legal obligations create affirmative obligations that conflict with
moral prohibitions (e.g. school children are required to salute a
flag in direct opposition to a religious mandate),8 ' or when
moral obligations become legally prohibited (e.g. when Peyote-
smoking Indians are not allowed to use mind altering drugs in
religious ceremonies).2
In the last two instances, in the conflict between opposing
obligation and prohibition, citizens rightly consider disobedi-
ence to legal duties and obligations. The moral obligations (or
prohibitions) at issue must supersede the conflicting legal
requirements for the actor to maintain integrity as a moral
agent.83 Any disobedience actually undertaken must recognize
and affirm the first and second order moral obligations applica-
ble to the situation at hand.84 Notice that it is not enough that
80. Note, Feminism in the Law: Theory, Practice and Criticism, 1989 U. CHI.
L. FOR. 219 (written by Catherine O'Neill).
81. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
82. See Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
83. "I think that we should be men first and subjects afterward."
Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, in S. LYND, supra note 7, at 60.
84. Robert Hall has said something similar:
... [Amn act of civil disobedience may be considered justified when
three conditions are satisfied:
(a) the moral reasons favoring disobedience must outweigh the
moral considerations in favor of obedience,
(b) the agent must acknowledge and maintain his general moral
obligation to obey the law and must view his disobedience as
transcending this prima facie duty (civil disobedience is thus
distinguished from rebellion and revolution),
(c) the agent must acknowledge and maintain his general moral
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a citizen consider a particular law obnoxious, or even "bad."
For civil disobedience to be justified, a true conflict between
opposing obligations must exist. Only when a citizen must opt
for one sufficiently weighty obligation over another does the
primacy of moral obligations outweigh the moral imperative of
obeying the law. The truth of this claim has force whether a
citizen is refusing to obey a law or actively violating one to
motivate political change.
These types of conflicts are not mere academic theorizing;
as I demonstrated previously, they have existed in the past and
there is no reason to believe they will not arise again. The
Quakers, Seventh Day Adventists, and other groups who were
instrumental in developing and supporting the Underground
Railroad believed that the legal requirement that they acqui-
esce in the operation of a legal system which made possible the
enslavement of Africans forcibly transplanted here violated
their moral duty to fellow beings. The Hungarian Freedom
Fighters refused to recognize the validity of laws responsible
for great injustice.8" And, the Civil Rights activists of the 1960s
who engaged in sit-ins at public facilities from which they were
legally barred were driven by moral beliefs that led them to
conclude the existing law was fundamentally immoral and
therefore invalid.86 As the history of disobedience in this coun-
try I laid out earlier showed, the list of groups who acted con-
trary to legal requirements which conflicted with the
obligations of conscience is long.87 Not all of this disobedience
to legal authority fit the definition of civil disobedience, but all
of it challenged an established law or set of laws.
We have looked briefly into the sources of moral and legal
obligation. The potential for their conflict, even in just polit-
ical orders, is plain. History has demonstrated that conflict has,
at times, existed and that some citizens who sought to respect
the just aspects of the legal order have resorted to acts that
conflicted with what they perceived to be unjust legal obliga-
tions in order to realize their more primary moral obligations.
Because of the courage and witness to justice shared by civil
obligation to respect the interests of others and must view his
disobedience as transcending this prima facie duty (civil
disobedience is thus distinguished from crime).
R. HALL, THE MORALITY OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 100 (1971).
85. See King, Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in S. LYND, supra note 7, at
470 (1963).
86. For a very brief, but enlightening, description of one such group,
see S. LYND, supra note 7, at xl-xli.
87. See text accompanying notes 1-68 supra.
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disobedients, grave acts of injustice were put to an end. Ron-
ald Dworkin, in Taking Rights Seriously, summarized the relation
between legal and moral duties:
... In a democracy, or at least a democracy that in princi-
ple respects individual rights, each citizen has a general
moral duty to obey all the laws, even though he would
like some of them changed. He owes that duty to his fel-
low citizens, who obey laws that they do not like, to his
benefit. But this general duty cannot be an absolute
duty, because even a society that is in principle just may
produce unjust laws and policies, and a man has duties
other than his duties to the State. A man must honour
his duties to his God and to his conscience, and if these
conflict with his duty to the State, then he is entitled, in
the end, to do what he judges to be right."8
In these situations, where moral obligation supersedes existing
legal obligation, disobedience can be justified. Indeed, in
order to preserve his integrity as a moral being, the citizen may
be compelled to disobey. His disobedience affirms his status as
a moral agent and the priority of his superseding moral
obligation.
The question of how the legal system should respond to
those citizens who disobey its laws but do so as a result of over-
riding moral obligation has not been answered. I have argued
that civil disobedience can, under the right conditions, bejusti-
fied. The rest of this article will focus on disobedience in prac-
tice and how it affects the community. After defining "civil"
disobedience and distinguishing it from "uncivil" disobedience
(or ordinary crime), I will recommend changes in our approach
to civil disobedience that should allow us to respond fairly to
those citizens who practice it.
C. A Definition and Characteristics
Scholars have adopted a variety of definitions for civil diso-
bedience.89 Gandhi's definition is perhaps the most simple:
"Civil Disobedience is civil breach of unmoral statutory enact-
88. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 186 (1978). He goes on to
say, "If he decides that he must break the law, however, then he must submit
to the judgment and punishment that the State imposes, in recognition of the
fact that his duty to his fellow citizens was overwhelmed but not extinguished
by his religious or moral obligation." Id.
89. See Bedau, On Civil Disobedience, 58 J. PHIL. 653, 661 (1961); A.
FORTAS, supra note 12, at 49 (1968); C. COHEN, supra note 76, at 39;J. RAWLS,
supra note 69, at 364 (1971); R. DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 104-16.
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ments."9 As far as it goes, this definition would not be
strongly contested. It does not, however, resolve the question
of perspective. Whose morality is qualified to judge the just-
ness of a law? No definition will answer that question. The
answer is different depending on who asks the question. The
preceding discussion makes clear that the conflict between
moral and legal obligations can be resolved only by the individ-
ual. To be sure, it must be informed by other members of the
community, but that assessment is ultimately an individual
judgment.
The definition designed by John Rawls is helpful. He
defines civil disobedience as "a public, nonviolent, conscien-
tious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim
of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the govern-
ment."'" The elements of this definition are important.
"Public" disobedience means that people who violate the
law for reasons of conscience must state or demonstrate the
reason for their disobedience. By so doing they distinguish
themselves from those who use force or fraud in unjust causes.
They affirm their acceptance of the community and its legal
order, as well as their disagreement with both. Their disobedi-
ence must reflect both the disagreement and their acceptance
of the legal order. For this reason, it must be publicly accom-
plished. This requirement would exclude disobedience like the
Underground Railroad, which succeeded because of its covert
operation, from a strict definition of civil disobedience.
Nonviolence as a goal has been present in all the examples
of civil disobedience presented earlier. That is not to say that
all of those acts have been nonviolent, but that the goal of the
action was not destruction of life or property. Civil dis-
obedients should seek nonviolence to demonstrate that they
assume the responsibility of community membership and act
with the best interests of the community in mind.
Civilly disobedient acts are meant to be both conscientious
and political. The political aspect of the act plays into the pur-
pose. Civil disobedience is usually done "with the aim of
bringing about a change in the law or policies of the govern-
ment." These acts speak to the body politic. Ballots also speak
to that body, but the electoral process rarely poses stark moral
choices to the electorate. The majority, furthermore, is quite
capable of being as wrong on moral matters as it can be on
other issues. As our history has shown, the majority has often
90. GANDHI: ESSENTIAL WRITINGS 30 (P. Murti ed. 1970).
91. J. RAWLS, supra note 69, at 364.
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been mistaken about what is right or just. Civil disobedience
speaks to and past the bureaucracy: it speaks to the people in
power, but calls them to reflect upon fundamental values. Peo-
ple who engage in civil disobedience believe that the majority
has lost touch, in some way, with the values that bind our soci-
ety together. Because it is a political act, done with the goal of
benefitting the community, civil disobedience legitimizes both
the government in power and the primacy of conscience.
Rawls provides several characteristics of civilly disobedient
acts within his definition. To his list I would add "limited."
Civil disobedients must be careful to avoid the slippery slope
into chaos that so troubled Justice Fortas.92 Their acts must be
clearly focused to draw attention to the unjust law they protest,
and must do no more. By limiting their disobedience in scope
and duration, they achieve their goal and avoid encouraging
general disorder. Myriad concerns about civil disobedience in
modern democracies have lead writers other than Gandhi and
Rawls to suggest characteristics or requirements for an act of
disobedience to be considered "civil," including that the civil
disobedient:
1) have exhausted all available constitutional means (to
demonstrate that law should be broken only when
necessary),
2) be willing to face arrest and punishment (by which the
dissenter acknowledges respect for the legal system),
3) have full knowledge of the law broken,
4) engage in only nonviolent expressions of dissent
(note that this condition is especially controversial),9"
and
5) make her disobedience public to acknowledge her
respect for the interests of other people.
94
I will keep these characteristics in mind as I continue my dis-
cussion and return to specific requirements for someone to fall
into the category of civil disobedient.
D. Civil Disobedient or Criminal?
Modern penal codes in the United States contain no defini-
tion of civil disobedience. They do not distinguish civil disobe-
dience from ordinary criminal acts. But those citizens who
engage in civil disobedience are different from ordinary
criminals. If they comply with the requirements listed above
92. A. FORTAS, supra note 12.
93. See, e.g., K. GREENAWALT, supra note 74, at 244-68.
94. See R. HALL, supra note 84, at 76-99.
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for "just" disobedience, they distinguish themselves and their
acts from criminals and criminal actions. Part of the difficulty
in talking about this distinction is that few acts of disobedience
actually meet the requirement of true conflict between oppos-
ing obligations; nevertheless, the distinction between civil dis-
obedients and ordinary criminals should be accounted for in
our criminal law.
The most significant difference between the civil disobedi-
ent and the criminal is that the civil disobedient does what she
does not only to resolve the conflict between conflicting moral
and legal obligations, but also to right what she perceives as an
unjust political order. As a result, her action attempts to "sup-
port and to further just institutions."95 She seeks to affirm
both her first and second order moral obligations, despite con-
flicting legal obligations. The criminal, on the other hand,
standardly does what she does out of self-interest and in viola-
tion of the respect citizens are required to show other persons
and their interests. So, too, the person who vindicates his
moral authority by attacking another, physically or otherwise,
violates the respect required toward other human beings. The
motives that lead these people to do outwardly similar acts are
drastically different. This difference in motive requires differ-
entjudicial treatment because it speaks directly to culpability. I
will return to the significance of this difference shortly.
Civil disobedients tend to be people who demonstrate
their respect for the legal system in other areas of their lives.
They seek not to overthrown the political system as a whole,
but to call it to task for failing to live up to foundational stan-
dards of justice. They are, in ideal, civically-minded people
from whose participation society as a whole benefits.
Because modern penal codes in the United States fail to
distinguish acts of civil disobedience from criminal acts, and
because our jurisprudential history has not accounted for the
moral context that leads someone to do civil disobedience,96
the response of the American judicial system to the presence of
civil disobedience is inadequate. Those citizens who seek to
redress injustices in legal and political structures and who find
no recourse in the "legal" means the democratic process offers
them,9 7 and those who believe that their duties to the state con-
95. See J. RAWLS, supra note 69, at 334.
96. See A. FORTAS, supra note 12, whose suspicion of civil disobedience
and fear of its potentially de-stabilizing effect appear to have won the day.
97. See H. ZINN, DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY: NINE FALLACIES ON
LAW AND ORDER (1968).
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flict with their duties to conscience, find themselves treated by
the judicial system like ordinary criminals. This response is
wholly inappropriate.
II. TOWARD A REASONED RESPONSE
A. A Potential Solution
1. Introduction
In the first part of this discussion I drew attention to the
fact that the United States history is replete with examples of
citizens who, when they felt the democratic process failing
them, turned to disobedience of unjust legal obligations to ful-
fill the dictates of their conscience and their duty to support
just institutions. I described some common characteristics of
civil disobedience and noted that our judicial treatment of the
violation of the penal code by civil disobedients does not reflect
the distinctions in motivation between civil disobedients, on
the one hand, and ordinary criminals and self-rigthteous assas-
sains, on the other. In this section of this article, I propose to
explore a possible solution to the inability of our judiciary to
recognize the differences between the civil disobedient and the
ordinary criminal. First, I will address several arguments that
have been made for how the legal system should respond to
civil disobedience. Those arguments have not been successful,
and generally for good reasons.
Legal scholars recommend a variety of potential solutions
to the problem of civil disobedience. Professor Ronald Dwor-
kin has suggested that there might be good reasons for not
prosecuting civil disobedients at all.9" Those reasons are not
persuasive outside of the academy. Other suggestions have
similarly lacked political feasibility. Professor Hugo Bedau has
suggested that every law "have a rider to the effect that anyone
who violates it on conscientious grounds shall be exempt from
prosecution and penalty." 99
Bedau fails to account for the prima facie second-order
moral obligation to obey even the unjust laws of a nearly just
state. He also draws precipitously close to allowing the govern-
ment to proscribe conduct indirectly through how it defines
"conscientious."' 0 0 By failing to define clearly what types of
98. R. DWORKIN, supra note 88, at 207.
99. Bedau, supra note 89, at 655.
100. Modern conscientious objector laws are good examples of this
phenomenon. By defining which conscience-based objections to armed
service will be recognized and which will not, the imprimatur of the
government for particular objections has come to mean the difference
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disobedience would qualify as "conscientious," Bedau's sug-
gestion offers little benefit to civil disobedients. Civil dis-
obedients are worse off under a system that could allow for
their protests to be prohibited covertly, through shifting defini-
tions, than they are under a penal system such as the one cur-
rently existing in the United States.
I will not argue that all civil disobedience should be pro-
tected or that civil disobedience should be encouraged by the
legal system. Our political system contains some safeguards
that act as a check on the effect of an unjust majority. The Con-
stitution is one such check. The Bill of Rights and due process
requirements protect minority voices. The doctrine of separa-
tion of powers also allows the judiciary to support or condemn
majoritarian legislative action. I argue that our legal system
should adequately account for the moral significance of civil
disobedience. The Constitution and judiciary have failed in the
past (as we saw earlier), and during some of those failures acts
of civil disobedience have helped to return our political system
to the correct path.
Three main arguments have been used to deal with civil
disobedience. They are: the Mistake of Law Defense, the
Necessity Defense, and Jury Nullification. I will take up each of
them in brief detail in the section which follows.
2. Mistake of Law Defense
Some traditional legal theorists have advocated the crea-
tion of a civil disobedience wing of a "mistake of law"
defense.' 0 ' If the "mistake of law" defense °2 was made avail-
able to civil disobedients, a defendant could avoid conviction
even if a law met constitutional requirements. Though sugges-
tions vary, one scholar argues that acquittal should result if a
defendant could meet the following requirements:
1. That the defendant had the purpose, not of dis-
obeying the law, but of demonstrating its unconstitu-
tional character.
between life and death. I suggest that civil disobedients should not want the
government, as an interested party, to make this determination.
101. Hughes, Civil Disobedience and the Political Question Doctrine, 43
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1968).
102. This defense exonerates a defendant who reasonably believed that
her acts were lawful. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) ("A belief that
conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a prosecution
for that offense based upon such conduct when: [the actor] acts in reasonable
reliance upon an official statement of the law .. ")
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2. That there was legitimate doubt about the constitu-
tionality of the law as perhaps evidenced by expert testi-
mony about the state of professional opinion.
3. That there was no way short of disobedience by
which the defendant could have obtained a determina-
tion of the validity of the law.
4. That the disobedience was nonviolent.'
03
Though rooted in a concern for demonstrating respect for the
legal order, this suggestion would not have reached injustices
which were constitutionalized (like slavery, previous to 1865)
and would also brush up against the reluctance of Federal
courts to open themselves up to giving advisory opinions.
3. Necessity Defense
A substantial number of legal thinkers have urged an
expansion of the use of the "necessity" defense" 4 to apply to
civil disobedience.' 0 5 Courts have generally rejected the neces-
sity defense as it might apply to civil disobedients. 10 6 Judges
view acts of disobedience and the defense of necessity offered
to exonerate protestors with undue suspicion.10 7 They fear
103. Hughes, supra note 101, at 5-6.
104. "The 'necessity defense' exonerates persons who engage in
conduct that ordinarily amounts to a crime under the pressure of
circumstances if the harm that would have resulted from compliance with the
law would have significantly exceeded the harm actually resulting from the
defendant's breach of the law. Successful use of the 'necessity defense'
requires (a) that there is no third and legal alternative available, (b) that the
harm to be prevented be imminent, and (c) that a direct, causal relationship be
reasonably anticipated to exist between defendant's action and the avoidance of the
harm." State v. Marley, 54 Haw. 450, 509 P.2d 1095 (1973) (emphasis
added).
105. See among others: Levitan, Putting the Government on Trial: The
Necessity Defense and Social Change, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1221 (1987); Lippman,
Civil Disobedience.: The Dictates of Conscience Versus the Rule of Law, 26 WASHBURN
L.J. 233, 246 (1987); Note, The State Made Me Do It: The Applicability of the
Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1173 (1987) (written by
Steven M. Bauer & Peter J. Eckerstrom); Note, Antinuclear Demonstrations and
the Necessity Defense: State v. Warshow, 5 VT. L. REV. 103 (1980) (written by
Michael J. Kessler) [hereinafter Kessler]; Note, Civil Disobedience as the Lesser
Evil, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 961 (1988) (written by Tammy A. Tierney)
[hereinafter Tierney].
106. See United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1982);
Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981); City of
St. Louis v. Klocker, 637 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). See also the
trespass conviction of Alex Luce in Morristown, NewJersey Municipal Court
(Docket number C1771) reported in N.Y. Times, April 30, 1991, § C, at 19.
107. "One who elects to serve mankind by taking the law into his own
hands thereby demonstrates his conviction that his own ability to determine
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that chaos that would result if individual citizens could choose
what laws they will follow and what laws they will not. Dwor-
kin, however, argues that it does not follow logically, and there
is no evidence that society will collapse if it tolerates not all, but
some, disobedience.' The fear of allowing limited defenses
to civil disobedients is without foundation.
While necessity may be a helpful defense to some citizens
who engage in civil disobedience, it lacks universal applicabil-
ity. The requirements are too strict,109 the standards too nar-
row, for a necessity defense to answer to the moral conflict
faced by some dissenters of conscience. When citizens protest
a policy or law by engaging in demonstrations that violate a
trespass statute, they do not expect that their action, by itself,
will cause the reform of the law to which they object. They will,
therefore, only very rarely meet the requirement that a rational
person could have concluded that their disobedient action by
itself would result in the change for which they hope.
4. Jury Nullification
Other scholars have recommended giving some backbone
to the jury power to "nullify"" 0 the defendant's conviction by
acquitting contrary to the clear law and facts."' Currently,
judges do not allow attorneys to inform jurors of their ability to
rule contrary to the law and facts. Judges also will not allow
policy is superior to democratic decision making. Appellant's professed
unselfish motivation, rather than a justification, actually identifies a form of
arrogance which organized society cannot tolerate." United States v. Cullen,
454 F.2d 386, 392 (7th Cir. 1971). See also United States v. Dougherty, 473
F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
108. R. DWORKIN, supra note 88, at 206.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Seward, where the court quotes the trial
court admissibility "ground rules":
7. Unless the offer of proof meets the very narrow limits of
justification defenses, evidence in support of those defenses will not
be received. . . . Among other things, the proffered evidence will
have to show:
1) A direct causal relationship between the defendant's actions and
the avoidance of the perceived harm. This includes a showing that a
reasonable man would think that blocking the entry to Rocky Flats
for one day would terminate the official policy of the United States
government as to nuclear weapons or nuclear power.
687 F.2d 1270, 1273 (1982).
110. Traditionally recognized as first affirmed in Bushel's Case, 124 ENG.
REP. 1006 (1670). See also United States v. Fielding, 148 F. Supp. 46, 56 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
111. See Scheflin & Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy,
43 J. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (1980). But see contra Scott, Jury Nullification:
An Historical Perspective on a Modern Debate, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 389 (1989).
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jury instructions to contain any reference to that power.112
Curiously, they reason that if the jury were informed of their
power, chaos would result as juries rendered decision after
decision with no principled connection with the penal code." 1
3
Such recklessness could work to the detriment as well as the
benefit of those engaging in civil disobedience. Even advocates
ofjury nullification have to recognize its limitations: jury nulli-
fication is most meaningful if defendants are permitted to
introduce evidence of motive, rationale, or moral imperative to
justify actions violative of legal obligation. Juries have no basis
to rule contrary to the law and in a defendant's behalf if they
are not allowed to know why she did what she did. Because
defendants cannot now introduce evidence of this type, the
right of nullification is impotent.
5. Conclusion
These solutions to the problem of prosecuting civil dis-
obedients have serious flaws. Either they do not respond to the
motivations that lead citizens to engage in civil disobedience,
or they do not account for the limitations of the legal system. I
hope that it is clear by now that the primary difference between
civil disobedience and crime lies in the motivation of the actor.
Any acceptable solution to the differences between a civil diso-
bedient and a criminal must account for the difference in their
motivation.
The admission of motive testimony to justify civilly disobe-
dient action would appropriately distinguish the action of the
civil disobedient from criminal activity. Unfortunately, how-
ever, motive is currently irrelevant for most offenses. The next
section will address the presence of "motive" in the criminal
law and how I think it should change. As we saw earlier, it is
precisely the issue of motive that distinguishes the civil disobe-
dient from the ordinary criminal. Because of this distinction,
civil disobedients should be allowed to admit motive testimony
or make "good motive" defense arguments.
1 1 4
112. Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895); United
States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
113. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1141 (1972) (Bazelon,
J., concurring).




a. What the Jury Gets to Hear
The current character of the criminal law does not allow
the defendant in a criminal case to present evidence describing
the motivation for his or her actions. The Model Penal Code" 1
5
defines culpability in terms of a person having satisfied the
state of mind requirements relative to each of the elements of
an offense. 1 6 Elements of an offense are those factors which
establish culpability for conduct based on state of mind with
respect to attendant circumstances, conduct, and results of
conduct.'17 The state of mind requirements focus on the
"intent," not the motive, of the defendant." 8 The motive of a
defendant is the reason for the action; intent is the state of mind
of the defendant relative to the elements of an offense. Motive
concerns why the defendant did what he did; intent focuses on
his level of cognitive commitment to what he did. The distinc-
tion has significant legal consequences.
State of mind is broken down into four levels of awareness
of what a person is doing. Under the M.P.C. scheme a person
must act either negligently, recklessly, knowingly, or purposely
with respect to each of the elements of an offense. To prove
culpability, the state must prove that a defendant acted with the
requisite level of conscious awareness for the conduct, circum-
stances, and result. Later, when I discuss the cases involving
the Berrigan brothers, these abstractions will be made more
concrete.
For persons who engage in civil disobedience, this struc-
ture causes a conflict. Most civil disobedients will admit all the
elements of their offense; they want to argue, however, that
they should not be punished for their act because either their
moral obligation is sufficiently weighty or their reason for act-
ing as they have justifies what they did. I will argue that civil
disobedients should, under certain conditions, be allowed to
present their motive to the jury. Because criminal law does not
now recognize the relevance of motive, we must amend our
criminal law statutes to make this possible. The amendment I
115. Used here as representative of modem criminal statutes.
116. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 [hereinafter M.P.C.].
117. M.P.C. § 1.13.
118. For an example of common state of mind standards, see M.P.C.
Article 2.
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propose would operate as a "justification" ' 19 for civil disobedi-
ence. I will describe it in more detail later.
If it is true that motive is the primary characteristic that
distinguishes civil disobedients from criminals, then a bar on
admission of motive testimony120 precludes civil disobedients
from making the very arguments with which the community,
represented by the jury, should be concerned. If we allow civil
disobedients to make motive arguments to the jury, we then
make it possible for the proper representatives of the con-
science of the community t 2t to assess whether the defendant's
claim of moral obligation is one which the community is pre-
pared to accept.
b. Problems With Punishing Civil Disobedients
People prosecuted for acts they would characterize as civil
disobedience commonly argue that their good motive should
excuse their conduct. 122 In addition to the difficulties with get-
ting a jury to hear the reason why a defendant did what she did,
another problem arises when we try to fit the civil disobedient
within one of the three historical theories of punishment: retri-
bution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. Though punishment is
not generally an issue within the purview of the trier of fact, the
incompatibility between punishment theories and civil dis-
obedients exemplifies yet another failure ofjudicial reaction to
disobedience.
To seek retribution for a trespass against the community
standards when the purpose of that trespass is to bring to light
the injustice of those standards does not reflect the proper rela-
tion between culpability and punishment. A civil disobedient is
not a proper candidate for retribution. Retribution models
seek to settle the score-to punish an offender in equal weight
to the injury they have inflicted. The moral imperative of pun-
ishment diminishes when the actor's self-interested pursuit of
some personal gain, to the detriment of others in the commu-
nity, is removed. Not all people who violate laws altruistically
119. As defined in M.P.C. Article 3, a justification is a complete defense
whereby a defendant's actions are held to be non-culpable even though she
has fulfilled all the requisite elements of an offense.
120. I use live testimony as my primary example because the majority
of evidence offered to support a civil disobedient's justifying motive would
necessarily come from viva voce testimony offered by the defendant.
Documentary evidence or testimony of other witnesses could also be subject
to the same analysis.
121. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1969).
122. See the Berrigan cases which follow.
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should avoid punishment, but juries should evaluate civil dis-
obedients in light of the reasons for their action.
The deterrent model of response to criminality is of ques-
tionable value also when it comes to civil disobedience. Deter-
rence theory depends upon a belief that if the punishment is
severe enough and sure enough the offense-considering citizen
will refrain from violating the law. If, however, citizens feel a
sufficiently weighty moral conflict with a community-imposed
legal obligation they are not likely, indeed in the ideal they will
never, choose to obey the legal obligation over that moral obli-
gation. The threat of severe punishment may not enter into
the balance. Before the act, the civil disobedient may balance
the importance of the relevant moral and legal obligations, not
the nature of the burden she will be required to bear for her
choice. At best, deterrence efforts, however severe, may be
ineffective because they may not factor into the equation of
whether to act or not to act. At worst, the deterrent theory of
punishment results in bullying tactics that do not account for
the philosophical underpinnings of civil disobedience that we
discussed earlier.
The rehabilitative theory of punishment is similarly inade-
quate to deal with the civil disobedient. The rehabilitative the-
ory of punishment responds to criminal behavior by trying to
convert an antisocial member of a society into a contributing
member through instruction or persuasion. Civil disobedients,
unlike criminals, have not proven themselves to be antisocial or
even in need of reform. They engage in the same balancing
that leads law-abiding citizens to choose to obey the law; for
the civil disobedient, the balance tips toward his perceived
moral obligation. In the same way, the judicial system should
hesitate to sanction those civically-minded citizens who con-
front the conflict between moral and legal obligations and fol-
low their moral obligation in hopes of law reform. In the past,
some citizens were subjected to psychological internment for
expressing political and moral convictions through violations
of the law.' 23 Rehabilitative punishment does not work for civil
disobedients because they don't need to be rehabilitated.
c. Motive Testimony as a Solution
Do I mean to say that we should not punish civil dis-
obedients at all? No, but we must realize that they are different
from most people who appear in our courtrooms, and that we
123. See the treatment of activists in the suffrage movement for women
in S. LYND, supra note 7, at 160-71.
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should approach punishing them for their violations of the law
differently. Not only are civil disobedients inappropriate for
most of the recognized justifications for punishment, but they
are different from most of the types of people we punish with
regularity.
One possible solution to the problem of how to respond to
the difference is to allow civil disobedients to do what they all
want to do: make arguments to the jury about why they did
what they did. As I noted above with jury nullification sugges-
tions, these arguments have been met with judicial suspicion, if
not hostility. Though I believe these fears are misplaced and
not responsive to the philosophical underpinnings of civil diso-
bedience, there are several problems which this suggestion
might precipitate, and I shall address them in turn.
Before I undertake a discussion of the problems that will
arise, I will take a look at contemporary judicial treatment of
arguments which have been made for a "good motive"
defense. After laying out some of the potential objections to
the use of motive testimony, I will explore some possible solu-
tions to those problems. Those solutions lead me to propose a
rule of evidence and an addition to the Model Penal Code to
accommodate the use of motive testimony in the prosecution of
civil disobedients.
2. Previous Attempts at the Use of Motive Testimony
The response of the judicial system to the "good motive"
defense has been stymied by unnecessary fear and by reasoning
which is unresponsive to the philosophical significance of the
conflict between moral and legal obligation. I have selected for
our attention two cases which are illustrative of the response of
courts to testimony regarding motive. In both cases, the
defendants sought to make arguments regarding the relation of
motive to culpability for the violations with which they were
charged.
a. Moylan
In United States v. Moylan,124 nine defendants, among them
Dan and Philip Berrigan, were charged with willful mutilation
of government records,' 25 destruction of government prop-
124. 417 F.2d 1002 (1969).
125. The defendants were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1361,
which provides in part:
Whoever willfully injures or commits any depredation against
any property of the United States, or of any department or agency
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erty, and interference with the administration of the Selective
Service System for their 17 May, 1968 removal and burning of
Selective Service records in Catonsville, Maryland. At trial, all
defendants were convicted. On appeal the defendants first
argued that the trial court erred in not informing the jury that it
possessed the power to nullify a conviction. 126 The defendants
also argued that the court should apply a "more expansive"
definition of "willfully"'' 2 7 than was used in the statutes. The
defendants argued that "since they acted from good motives,
i.e. to protest a war which they sincerely believed was not only
illegal but immoral, they could not have 'willfully' violated the
statutes and must be acquitted."'
2 8
The appellate court correctly distinguished "motive" from
"intent" and noted that the intent element of "willfully" is sat-
isfied if the "accused acted intentionally, with knowledge that
he was breaching the statute."'' 29 Despite sloppy use of techni-
cal definitions of intent for defining culpability, .the appellate
court was correct in finding that "whatever motive may have
led [the defendants] to do the act is not relevant to the ques-
tion of the violation of the statute, but is rather an element
proper for the judge's consideration in sentencing."' 30
The restriction on use of evidence related to motive
emphasizes the judicial interest in fairness in adjudicating vio-
lations of the law.' 3 ' Regardless of substantive differences,
materially similar violations require similar response by the
thereof, or any property which has been or is being manufactured or
constructed for the United States, or any department or agency
thereof, shall be punished as follows: .... (emphasis added)
126. Whereby the jury could have acquitted the defendants even if
their act fulfilled all the elements of the offense.
127. See supra note 125.
128. Moylan, supra note 124, at 1004.
129. Id. Note, however, that M.P.C. § 2.02(7) defines "wilfulness" as
follows: "A requirement that an offense be committed willfully is satisfied if a
person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense,
unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears." The appellate
court is not strictly accurate in requiring that the defendant act "intentionally,
with knowledge that he was breaching the statute." The intent element for
conduct, as specified by the statute, would be "knowingly," not
"intentionally" or "purposefully" as defined by the appellate court. For a
further discussion of element analysis of statutory provisions see, Robinson
and Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and
Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681 (1983).
130. Moylan, supra note 124, at 1004.
131. See, e.g., the court's discussion in United States v. Kabat, 797 F.2d
580, 584-85 (8th Cir. 1986), where the court looked at previous treatment of
people who violated the same statute for different reasons to argue that these
well-intentioned defendants should be treated no differently.
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judicial system. In, other words, courts consider it unfair to
punish a person who violates a law out of self-interest and not
punish someone who violates the same law for the betterment
of the community. 32 Moreover, they consider it unfair not to
punish those who do not fulfill their legal obligations when
others who could have violated the law did not in recognition
of their prima facie obligation to obey the law.1
3 1
Contrary to common belief, it is fair that the people who
violate the law because of conflicting moral obligation not be
punished. Even though other people choose not to obey the
law, the law-abiding person, if aware of any potential conflict,
goes through the same analysis as those who disobey. The law-
abiding person performs the same balancing of moral and legal
obligations as the civil disobedient does. The only significant
difference is the outcome. The law-abiding person concludes
that his legal obligations outrank his moral obligations. So,
too, the action of a criminal and a protester are different from
one another. The law should treat them differently, because in
this instance motive is an important element of culpability.
A grossly simplified demonstration may help: When Mary
knocks her sister down to be mean, her parents appropriately
punish her. When she knocks her sister down to shield her
from an oncoming car, her parents appropriately applaud her.
The two acts, like the violation of the law by the common crimi-
nal and the civil disobedient, are materially similar, but sub-
stantively different. The law should be equipped to respond to
them differently.
b. Berrigan
The second, very similar and factually related example I
would like to focus upon began as United States v. Berrigan.'
34
Several months before the events which precipitated the Moylan
decision took place the following occurred: Two of the Caton-
sville defendants and two other men extracted some of their
own blood and mixed it with animal blood. They entered a
Selective Service office in Baltimore, Maryland in the early
morning. They went beyond the counter, opened cabinets
containing Selective Service documents, and poured the blood
132. See United States v. Cullen, supra note 107.
133. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320-21
(1967).
134. 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968). This decision was later upheld as
United States v. Eberhardt, at 417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1969)-the companion
case to Moylan.
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mixture over the documents. They then left the building and
waited for police to arrive. At trial, the defendants sought to
offer evidence to the jury demonstrating that based on what
they knew of the war in Vietnam, the war was illegal and
immoral.
The defendants argued that because they acted .under the
belief that their actions were geared toward prohibiting the
United States from engaging in further illegal activity, the req-
uisite mens rea for conviction was lacking. 35 The trial court
noted that after the elements of a crime are proven by the gov-
ernment, good motive will not save the defendant from convic-
tion. ' 6 The defendants cited to cases where the accused
mistakenly believed that he was acting within the law. The
court distinguished those cases by observing that these defend-
ants knew that what they were doing was illegal but acted under




The court also made the paradigmatic objection to the use of
motive as dispositive of guilt or innocence:
No civilized nation can endure where a citizen can select
what law he would obey because of his moral or religious
belief. It matters not how worthy his motives may be. It
is axiomatic that chaos would exist if an individual were
permitted to impose his beliefs upon others and invoke
justification in a court to excuse his transgression of a
duly-enacted law.'
3 8
3. Why "Good Motive" Arguments Have Failed
The arguments of the Berrigan defendants failed for two
reasons.' 3 9 First, the proponents of both arguments suffered
from a mistaken understanding of the definitions of "intent"
and "motive." Remember that within the criminal law these
terms have a specific meaning that is significant, even if
counter-intuitive. "Intent" relates to the required state of
mind of the accused as applied to each element of an offense.
"Motive" relates to the system of belief or purpose which
guided an actor. Moral obligation is a matter of both motive
and intent in the standard case; so motive testimony falls under
135. United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336, 338 (1968).
136. Id. at 339.
137. Id. at 340.
138. Id. at 339.
139. For further discussion of these two cases see Note, Civil
Disobedience-Protests Beyond the Law, 14 ST. Louis U.LJ. 719 (1970) (written by
Kathianne Knaup).
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the category of motive not intent. 4  The motive arguments
the defendants sought to make had no bearing on the state of
mind required by the statute for conviction.
The second failure of the Berrigans was to characterize
their arguments in terms of an excuse to culpability, rather
than as a justification for their actions. The motive testimony
the defendants sought to offer would have served, not to
negate one of the elements of the offense, as would an excuse
(e.g. insanity or mistake of fact),' 4 ' but to counter the elements
of the offense with a reason why the defendant should not be
held responsible for violating the statute. Everyone involved
knew that the Berrigans violated the statute in question.
Whether or not they violated it was not the issue. The issue
was whether or not they merited punishment for their
violation.
The commonly-accepted justifications for violating the law
(self-defense defense of others, duress, necessity, choice of
evils, law enforcement, and so forth) do not include a justifica-
tion for civil disobedients. As we have seen, some people have
sought to fit civil disobedience within the categories of neces-
sity142 and duress 14 justifications, but with only limited suc-
cess. Only by creating a separate category of justification, a
civil disobedience justification, can we respect the importance
of moral obligation as a motivator of a political act of
disobedience.
C. Proposed Amendments
This section will define the amendments I propose to both
the Model Penal Code and the Federal Rules of Evidence. I
address my attention to the Model Penal Code and the Federal
Rules because these rules or some variation on them has been
adopted in most jurisdictions. The additions to the Model
Penal Code are far more important for the purposes of provid-
ing a justification for the conduct of some civil disobedients
than is the change I recommend to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, but the change to the evidentiary rules follows from the
penal code reform. Jurisdictions which have adopted the
model provisions would have to enact the amendments I pro-
pose; those which have not yet adopted the uniform standards
140. See text accompanying notes 115-19 supra.
141. See M.P.C. Article 3.
142. See Levitan, Lippman, and Kessler, supra note 105.
143. See Tierney, supra note 105.
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would have to make the appropriate conversions to their own
system.
1. The Model Penal Code
a. Justifications in General
Article Three of the Model Penal Code defines the General
Principles of Justification. A justification is different from an
excuse to culpability, like insanity or mistake of fact. Ajustifica-
tion admits the elements of the offense and finds that even
when all the elements of the offense are proven a defendant
should not be held criminally responsible.'4 4 The Model Penal
Code describes these justifications as "affirmative
defense[s].' 45 By that description the drafters mean that the
justification does not act to negate one of the elements of the
offense, but instead negates culpability of the agent when the
elements are proven. A defendant asserting an affirmative
defense bears the burden of proving the elements of the
defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
b. A Civil Disobedience Justification
The proposed section 3.12 of the Model Penal Code would
read as follows:
§ 3.12. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE JUSTIFICATION
(1) Requirements
The violation of legitimately-enacted criminal standards
of conduct is justified when the actor reasonably believes
that the legal requirement conflicts with a serious moral
obligation and only if:
(a) all reasonable legal alternatives to violation have
been pursued,
(b) the violation is nonviolent in character,
(c) the violation is specifically limited and narrowly
tailored to suit the character of the conflict, and
(d) the actor can demonstrate the existence of a
legitimate moral belief the vindication of which substan-
tially outweighs the governmental interest in prohibiting
the conduct at issue.
14 6
(2) Admissibility of Evidence
144. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 759-98 (1978).
145. M.P.C. § 3.01.
146. This requirement would involve evaluations similar to those
undertaken in the area of religious practices where the sincerity and
seriousness of the belief held by the individual and the governmental
interests involved in the regulation are balanced.
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Evidence of the motives of the actor claiming the Civil
Disobedience Justification is admissible and limited to
the testimony of the actor, relevant experts, and docu-
mentary evidence, describing:
(a) the legitimacy and substance of the belief at
issue, and
(b) the process by which the actor arrived at the
decision to violate the law.
2. The Federal Rules of Evidence
Evidence of the motive of the defendant in a criminal case
is not generally admissible under the Federal Rules because it
is not relevant under Rule 401. Because the motive of the
defendant does not tend to make the existence of any of the
elements of the crime more likely or unlikely, such evidence is
not relevant to any issue of material fact. Under the proposed
amendment, evidence related to motive would become rele-
vant, but an addition to the Federal Rules of Evidence is neces-
sary to clarify the scope of the admission of motive evidence in
a criminal case. Because the proposed rule addresses relevancy
and admissibility, it should be added to the list of rules con-
tained in Article 4.
The Federal Rules of Evidence should be amended to
include the following provision:
Rule 413. Admission of Motive Testimony when the
Civil Disobedience Justification is raised.
(a) In a criminal trial, in which the person accused of vio-
lating a provision of law raises the Civil Disobedience
Justification (see Model Penal Code § 3.12), evidence of
the motive(s) of the accused for the violation is admissi-
ble to show legitimacy and sincerity of belief, serious con-
flict of conscience, and the balancing of competing
obligations that led to the decision to violate the law.
(b) If the accused intends to offer under subdivision (a)
evidence pertaining to the motive for the violation, the
accused shall make a written motion to offer such evi-
dence not later than fifteen days before the date on which
the trial in which such evidence is to be offered is sched-
uled to begin.
(c) The motion described in paragraph (b) shall be
accompanied by a written offer of proof. If the court
determines that the offer of proof contains evidence
described in paragraph (a) the court shall order a hearing
to determine whether a given act fulfills the requirements
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necessary to seek recourse in the justification. At such
hearing the parties may call witnesses and offer evidence
that would be relevant if the qualifications for the justifi-
cation were met.
(d) If the court determines on the basis of the hearing
described in paragraph (c), that the qualifications for the
justification have been met and that the court will permit
recourse to the justification, evidence thereby made rele-
vant shall be admissible in the trial to the extent an order
made by the court specifies evidence which may be
offered and areas with respect to which the accused may
be examined or cross-examined.
(e) If the court determines on the basis of the hearing
described in paragraph (c), that the qualifications for the
justification have not been met, the evidence described in
paragraph (a) is inadmissible.
D. Potential Problems
Of course, this proposal will be met with disagreement. I
have already alluded to some of the pertinent objections. In
this section, I will focus on five of those complaints. Following




Judge Northrop, the judge who decided the Berrigan case,
offers the paradigmatic objection to the use of motive testi-
mony.' 47 His fear of the chaos that would result from accom-
modating civil disobedience has been shared by other members
of the judiciary. The argument depends on the acceptance of
several points. First, civilized societies require laws to maintain
order. Second, only when society is ordered can justice be
achieved. Third, citizens in democratic societies voluntarily
agree to act according to the laws of society, even those that
bring personal burdens, by accepting the benefits of the order
they bring. Finally, nearly-just societies could not exist if every
citizen could select whatever laws he or she would obey.
This problem would not arise if decisions were arrived at
by unanimous consent, but since unanimous consent is not a
practical objective, occasions will arise where some subset of
society will find themselves at odds with the majority. The
147. Supra note 138.
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chaos argument claims that if at every occasion where a disa-
greement of this kind arose citizens were free to obey or not
obey on a whim, anarchy would result. Society would col-
lapse.' 48 This strain of argument presupposes that violation of
the law would increase if the threat of punishment of civil diso-
bedience was removed as a deterrent. I have already discussed
the inadequacy of punishment to deter civil disobedience.
As part of the "chaos" claim, courts point to the political
chaos that could result from courts intruding upon the prov-
ince of the legislature. In asking the court to validate her
"excuse" for why she did what she did, the civilly disobedient
citizen seeks the power of the court to vindicate her claim to
moral superiority.' 49 Courts should not engage in this sort of
variation on the legislative intent. If representative legislatures
do fairly speak for the majority of citizens, then the place to
vindicate the injustices experienced by the protestor is in the
legislature, not in the courts.
b. Response
Judge Northrop's assumption, though popularly sup-
ported, is flawed. He is correct in so far as he claims that it is
"axiomatic" that civilized society could not survive if every citi-
zen always followed only what laws fit his or her fancy. As
pointed out by Dworkin, however, while it is surely true that
society cannot endure "if it tolerates all disobedience; it does
not follow, nor is there evidence, that it will collapse if it toler-
ates some"' 50 (emphasis added). Carl Cohen says, "As a resi-
dent and an observer of a municipality in which civil
disobedience has been several times employed in recent years,
I would report that so far as I can tell, its practice has had little
or no tendency to encourage disrespect for law or to cause a
general deterioration of the social order."'' Even Justice For-
tas, an outspoken critic of civil disobedience, warns that "[t]he
danger of serious national consequences from massive civil dis-
obedience may easily be exaggerated."'' 52 Jurisdictions which
148. Justice Fortas echoed these views when he said, "Just as we expect
the government to be bound by all laws, so each individual is bound by all of
the laws under the Constitution. He cannot pick and choose. He cannot
substitute his own judgment or passion, however, noble, for the rules of law."
A. FORTAS, supra note 12, at 55.
149. United States v. Kabat, 797 F.2d 580, 587 (8th Cir. 1986).
150. R. Dworkin, supra note 88, at 206.
151. C. COHEN, supra note 76, at 152-53. Note, however, that Cohen is
specifically referring to a society in which civil disobedience is punished.
152. A. Fortas, supra note 12, at 59.
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adopt my proposal will see that admitting the testimony regard-
ing motive of some violators of the law does not mean that
those persons will be acquitted. Not everyone who makes a
claim of justification predicated upon conscience will find his
claim vindicated. A Civil Disobedience Justification only makes
it possible for juries to hear the moral evidence relevant to
their determination of culpability.
Like the presumption that serious chaos would result from
the toleration of some disobedience, the presupposition that
more people would be inclined to engage in civil disobedience
if they knew that they could be acquitted is unverified. While it
is reasonable to assume that some people would be more likely
to engage in civil disobedience if they believed that they had a
chance of getting their claim vindicated, if we limit the claims
we are willing to recognize to those predicated on conscience
or moral obligation, the growth in the number of incidents
should not be severe.
Also, the fact that juries acquit civil disobedients based on
their claim that a particular law is unjust should serve as addi-
tional notice to the legislators that their decisions are not sup-
ported. I say "additional" notice because appeal to this
justification will require that the defendant have used legal
means of persuasion unsuccessfully before choosing to disobey
the law. Courts would not, contrary to possible fears, be
rewriting laws by failing to prosecute individual civil dis-
obedients any more than they rewrite laws when they fail to
prosecute individuals who use force to protect themselves,
others, or property. Judge Northrop's concerns about coming
chaos are unfounded; the history of civil disobedience in this
country argues against his worries and the results of a justifica-
tion would not be as dire as he imagines.
2. Courts Should Not Become Political Platforms
a. Criticism
If testimony and evidence of motive were to become
admissible, courts would find their already backlogged dockets
delayed even further by defendants who wanted to parade a
stream of "experts" before a jury to demonstrate the sound-
ness of their position. Under such circumstances, courtrooms
would cease to be forums for the investigation and evaluation
of facts applied to relevant law, but would instead dissolve into
platforms for any political minority who felt their views under-
represented.
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b. Response
This criticism is serious, because it cuts to the core of the
integrity of the judicial system. Fortunately, the problems of
politicization of the judicial process 53 can be overcome
through discriminate use of the justification I propose. Those
defendants who want to claim as a justification for their action
the motivation of conscience must satisfy strict requirements.
To make my amendment viable, I also propose what I call
"qualifying characteristics" for a defendant to be able to avail
herself of the justification.'54 The characteristics I propose
require that an act be nonviolent, non-destructive, limited, and
narrowly-tailored for the justification to be available.
The defendant would demonstrate to the court that she
"qualified" for the exception by providing evidence to show
that her act met all the requirements. Robert Hall in arguing
for an extension of the jury nullification powers has argued that
"[t]o qualify as an act of civil disobedience, an action would
have to be appropriate to the agent's stated purpose, and the
purpose itself would have to be of a socially responsible
nature."'5 Since these demonstrations could happen during
the pretrial stage, they could be handled expeditiously and
without undue influence upon the jury.
If the persons seeking to make motive arguments to the
jury were limited by factors such as those described above,'56
the judge could retain some control over the politicization of
the trial process. Once a person "qualified" for the exception,
the judge could then allow only such evidence as would directly
address the motivation of the defendant and could limit the
burden on the trial process accordingly.
153. By this term I mean something different than former Judge Bork
does. He uses the phrase "politicization of the law" to refer to the political
process and its influence over the judiciary, particularly in the area of
constitutional jurisprudence. In short, I mean my use of the term to be less
inclusive than does Judge Bork. See R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw (1990).
154. I am not committed to the factors I list, nor does my argument
hinge on the reader accepting them. Those characteristics which would
define a "civil disobedient act" under the statute could be negotiated, and in
fact could differ from state to state. It is important, however, that certain
types of actions "qualify" for the justification and others fail to qualify. This
limitation will address most of the chaos concerns that would give a
legislature pause in accepting my recommendation.
155. R. HALL, supra note 84, at 146.
156. See text accompanying notes 144-46 supra.
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3. Degeneration of the Proper Role of the Jury
a. Criticism
Juries in America have undergone many changes and evo-
lutions from the days of Georgia v. Brailsford 57 when they were
considered the masters of both law and fact. Today, jurors are
expected to listen to the facts as presented by evidence admit-
ted during trial and to apply the law as given to them by the
judge. Though the power to rule contrary to the given law and
admitted facts still exists,' the right to be informed of that
power has been denied.' 59 The third argument against
allowing the admission of motive testimony or evidence in the
trial of civil disobedients is that if juries were given the ability
to "excuse" the conduct of someone who violated the law, they
would be overstepping their powers.
b. Response
Justice White has stated that the "essential feature of ajury
lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of
the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the
community participation that results from that group's deter-
mination of guilt or innocence."'160 If the justification I advo-
cate were put into effect, "'conscientious disobedience' would
have the effect of allowing the question to be put to the jury in
such a way that the demands of conscience and the social
responsibility of the agent could be taken into account."16'
Rather than moving the jury into some nebulous field of
power where it would have free reign to make decisions outside
of the stream of legal authority, giving the jury the power, in
limited circumstances, to listen to testimony regarding the
motivation of a civil disobedient would lead the jury to the bal-
ancing of values appropriate to such action. The jury would
evaluate the sincerity of the beliefs of the defendant, the impor-
tance of the independent moral autonomy of each citizen, the
gravity of the interest or alleged injustice at issue, and the form
and content of the act of disobedience. They would then bal-
ance those interests against the societal interest in maintaining
legal order, the potentially degenerating effect of disobedience,
whether or not the defendant pursued all reasonable legal rem-
157. 3 U.S. 1 (1794).
158. See United States v. Fielding, 148 F. Supp. 46 (1957).
159. See United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (1969).
160. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1969).
161. Id. at 147.
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edies, and the community's view of the injustice pointed to by
the defendant.
4. Civil Disobedients Will Not Really Be Better Off With
This Justification
a. Criticism
Extending the power of the jury to acquit people the legis-
lature clearly intended to be convicted could, as mentioned
previously, act to the detriment as well as the benefit of a civil
disobedient. Black defendants in the South of the 1960s could
have found themselves at the mercy of racist, white juries, who
would have been wholly unpersuaded by arguments supporting
potentially reasonable violations of unjust laws.
Extending the power of the jury to consider motive testi-
mony might put the civil disobedient in no better position than
she had been previously. She, rather than facing a legislature
unresponsive to her claims of injustice, would have to face
members of a jury who have values similar to those of their
representatives. If the legislature has been unresponsive to her
claims, she has no reason to assume that she will have any
greater luck with a jury. Allowing the admission of motive tes-
timony only presents a false hope.
b. Response
This concern fails to recognize two things. First, the possi-
bility of appeal from criminal prosecutions helps to negate the
detrimental effects of a biased jury. If a civil disobedient was
presented with a racially, sexually, ethnically, or religiously dis-
criminatory jury, a prosecution under such circumstances
would be appealable. The problem caused by racist juries is
solved by making juries less racist. 162 Second, many people
today, especially those likely to engage in civil disobedience,
perceive either themselves or the people they represent to be
politically powerless. Allowing appropriate civil disobedients
to make claims of injustice which might otherwise go unheard
can only work to the advantage of the community. Juries will
vindicate claims of substantial injustice and so continue to
ensure that legislative actions are in tune with the community's
standards of justice. They will likewise refuse to vindicate
162. See Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991), and Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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those claims which do not resonate with the foundations of our
political system.
5. Civil Disobedients Depend Upon the Sympathy and
Attention Their Punishment Engenders
a. Criticism
Finally, it could be argued that civil disobedience, as a con-
cept, requires that those who engage in it should suffer to draw
attention to their claim. The justification I propose would
allow some civil disobedients to avoid punishment. This argu-
mentwould claim that the prima facia benefit they gain by avoid-
ing the undesirable result of punishment would be outweighed
by the loss of public sympathy.
Certainly, many people who have engaged in civil disobe-
dience in the past have willingly accepted the punishment they
knew would befall them as a result of their action. They did so
to affirm publicly their belief in the legitimacy of the political
system and to attract publicity. Civil rights activists in the
1960s and women's rights demonstrators knew that they would
be punished for refusing to leave the lunch counter and for
registering for an election that forbade their vote. They con-
tested their guilt and, in some cases, accepted their punish-
ment. In theory, the cause of justice benefitted from their
punishment.
b. Response
To ask a civil disobedient to willingly accept punishment
for violating a law he or she considers to be unjust is counter-
intuitive. They may accept their punishment for a variety of
reasons, but the law currently allows them no choice in this
matter. The amendment I propose would give civil dis-
obedients the opportunity to square their account with society,
to tell a jury and the court why they did what they did. They
could choose not to avail themselves of the justification, and
they then might be found guilty. The odds of their conviction
would increase dramatically by their refusal. They could also
make their plea to the jury, and still be found guilty. The
amendment only gives the civil disobedient a choice in whether
or not to accept punishment "willingly." It is important to
note that this criticism goes to a tactical point that should be
left up to the civil disobedient. Some disobedients might
believe that their willing acceptance of punishment is an impor-
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tant part of their message. Others may not. By making ajusti-
fication available to them they can make that choice.
6. Summary
The balancing approach used by a jury in assessing indi-
vidual claims ofjustification would be similar to the process the
civil disobedient underwent in deciding to favor moral obliga-
tion over legal obligation. At the very least, this process of
allowing motive testimony after successful qualification for a
"Civil Disobedience Justification," would demonstrate judicial
comprehension of and respect for the importance of moral
obligation. The toleration society would be extending to the
civil disobedient would be similar in kind to that offered to con-
scientious objectors.'6 3
Under this proposal "civil disobedience would be no more
tolerated than the community wished."'" I am arguing not for
the acquittal of all civil disobedients, but for a judicial process
that accounts for the distinctions which I have shown between
criminals and civil disobedients, addresses the conflict between
moral and legal obligations-and the primacy of moral obliga-
tions-in a systematic way, and demonstrates an appreciation
for the benefits our society has gained by the courage of those
who have stood up in the face of perceived injustice.
CONCLUSION
This article has made the case for an amendment to the
Model Penal Code and the Federal Rules of Evidence which
will permit persons who engage in civil disobedience to have
recourse to a Civil Disobedience Justification. The argument
supporting this amendment is based on two fundamental
claims. The first claim is that civil disobedience has been a sig-
nificant part of the history of this nation, one from which we
have derived significant benefit. The second claim is that the
response of the judiciary to the phenomenon of civil disobedi-
ence has been inadequate and misguided. From these two
claims I conclude that the present situation is not acceptable
and that we need to change our understanding of and approach
to civil disobedience.
The first section of the article traced the development of
disobedience and resistance in the United States since before it
was a nation until the present. The pre-Revolutionary strug-
163. R. HALL, supra note 84, at 150.
164. Id.
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gles for religious toleration led, in part, to the revolution and
break from Britain. Challenges by blacks and women to the
white male definition of "equality" resulted in new relation-
ships among citizens. The Labor movement and Civil Rights
movement demanded that rights guaranteed in the past be
brought to fruition. The Vietnam era and actions of civilly dis-
obedient groups and individuals today show that this problem
remains with us. Attention to these events in our history led to
a close scrutiny of the origins of the duty to obey the law and to
the moral environment in which citizens might justifiably
choose to disobey the law. In the final part of the first section I
offered a definition of what types of disobedience to law would
qualify as civil disobedience..
My second claim began with the conclusion of the first sec-
tion, that civil disobedience will continue to be practiced and
that we must reform our judicial reaction to it. I then focused
on several methods of responding to civil disobedience and its
distinctions from crime that have been used in the past. Those
solutions have failed to account for the moral significance of
civil disobedience. One worthy option, which has not received
widespread support, is to allow civil disobedients to testify to
their motives for violating the law. I described the two Berri-
gan cases, where the defendants argued unsuccessfully that a
"good motive" justified their actions. I then proposed my
amendment to the Model Penal Code and Federal .Rules of Evi-
dence as a possible mechanism for making motive testimony
admissible in trial and useful to civil disobedients. Finally, I
responded to some of the potential criticisms of my suggestion.
Civil disobedience is here to stay. Our jurisprudence to
date has not responded to its true significance. Adoption of a
justification defense for civil disobedients would be a step in
the right direction.
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